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AN ESSAY ON REBUILDING AND RENEWAL  
IN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 
Jack Graves* 
The American model of legal education is broken as a value1 
proposition.2  Like a building with an undermined foundation, it must 
be rebuilt rather than refurbished.  And, like any rebuilding project, it 
will be costly and disruptive to many of its occupants.  However, it 
will also present unique opportunities for innovation and renewal.  
This essay suggests a few of the contours for such a rebuilding pro-
ject and describes a few of the benefits that might result. 
I. THE PROBLEM 
To begin, let us clear away some of the nonsense that far too 
often mires any progress towards real change within the legal acade-
my.  This is not simply an acute problem arising from a recent eco-
nomic downturn.  Instead, it reflects a chronic and substantial in-
crease in the real cost of a legal education over the past thirty years, 
coupled with a real decrease in the economic value of that education 
based on significant changes in the world in which lawyers earn their 
livings.  The increase in cost was almost certainly fueled by the com-
bination of law school competition for ratings fame and the easy 
 
* Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.  The views contained in 
this essay are solely my own.  I do, however, wish to acknowledge the extensive, and very 
much appreciated, collaborative contributions and support of my colleague, Meredith R. Mil-
ler, in developing the ideas put forth in this essay.  Any shortcomings are, of course, solely 
my own. 
1 In this essay, I will use the term “value” to indicate “financial value.”  I would of course 
acknowledge that there are many extraordinary intangible values associated with a legal edu-
cation, and many worthy objectives in pursuing a legal education beyond merely “making 
money.”  However, those intangibles and alternative objectives are rendered entirely moot if 
graduates cannot even feed and house themselves while making their loan payments.  In 
short, the “value” proposition necessarily fails if the result is unreasonable financial hard-
ship.  See infra p. 8 (explaining more fully how neither the IBR nor PAYE provides a viable 
general solution to this problem). 
2 See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012). 
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availability of student loans,3 while the downward economic pressure 
on lawyer earnings has likely reached its most recent and extreme 
crisis proportions as a result of technological innovations.4  Whereas 
these innovations generally provide a boon to clients, they are provid-
ing a disruptive near term bane for many lawyers—not to mention 
law schools and their faculty members.5 
Moreover, the issue is not solely a matter of making legal ed-
ucation better.6  To be sure, many aspects of modern legal education 
can be improved (and, in many cases, are being improved)—
especially those related to legal practice skills and rapidly evolving 
technological innovations.  The current quality of American legal ed-
ucation is, however, almost certainly better than ever before and bet-
ter than anywhere else in the world.  Quality is not the most signifi-
cant problem today.  Nor is the issue limited to greedy would-be-
lawyers seeking hefty salaries from prestigious law firms.7  In fact, 
 
3 See George Critchlow, Kim Kardashian and Honey Boo Boo: Models for Law School 
Success (or Not), 45 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2046339 (analogizing law schools’ chase for U.S. News ranking 
“fame” to the more general chasing of “fame” by the title characters). 
4 See, e.g., William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013) (thoroughly addressing the technology driven structural changes in today’s legal mar-
ket), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2202823.  Even the 
most skeptical observer would presumably agree today that this current “crisis” is not a mere 
cyclical downturn and, instead, reflects a structure sea change in the market for legal services 
and the employment opportunities for law school graduates.  See id. 
5 See Benjamin H. Barton, A Glass Half Full Look at the Changes in the American Legal 
Market, available at http://www.masonlec.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Barton-IJLE-
DRAFT.pdf (explaining that life would likely get “significantly worse for the majority of 
law professors, corporate law firm partners and associates in the near term and for the fore-
seeable future”); see also Critchlow supra note 3. 
6 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 4 (providing a variety of ideas for improving the educa-
tional product, but little, if anything, by way of suggestions for reducing tuition). 
7 See, e.g., The Brian Lehrer Show: Justice Sotomayor, WNYC (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://www.wnyc.org/shows/bl/2013/jan/22/justice-sotomayor/ (“Yes, it’s hard to get jobs, 
but when you talk to most people, it’s hard to get the jobs that are paying them the big bucks 
that they want.  There are plenty of jobs out there to serve communities that have needs; they 
just don’t pay a lot of money.  But if that becomes the measure or the goal in your life, than 
you are no longer concentrating on what I think is the most important part of the legal pro-
fession, and that is the one of caring, the caring of community, the caring of people in it, and 
the caring about what you are doing.”).  While it is easy to dismiss the increased recent focus 
on ROI overly focused on money, it is much harder to focus on anything else when one is 
drowning in unserviceable loan debt.  See John E. Thies, American Bar Association Task 
Force on the Future of Legal Education (Feb. 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/task
forcecomments/febhearing2013_john_thies_comment.authcheckdam.pdf (pointing out the 
inability of graduates with enormous debt burdens to perform public interest work or provide 
low cost legal services). 
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the rarified niche of legal education serving students most likely to 
land those hefty big-firm salaries (and, to a large degree, always hav-
ing served those students) still seems to be chugging along, though 
increasingly isolated from the less affluent reality beyond its borders.  
The real problem in legal education today involves the “middle class” 
of law students and law graduates and, in particular, the “lower mid-
dle class,” who are increasingly finding themselves impoverished by 
the cost of their educational experience, with few opportunities for 
recovering from this law school imposed poverty.8  The problem with 
the vast majority of legal education is clear and simple.  The price of 
tuition is too damn high9—and it is too damn high by a lot! 
I am often asked by colleagues, “how did it come to this?”  I 
think there are two parts to the answer (one of which is mentioned 
above).  First, and simplest, we all got far too caught up in the very 
expensive annual beauty pageant organized to no good end by U.S. 
News and World Report.10  Second, and somewhat less obvious, we 
were fooled11—or at least lulled into a sense of complacency—by a 
bifurcation in the employment market for our graduates.  And, of 
course, the easy availability of student loans made such “foolishness” 
and “complacency” so much easier. 
For the better part of the past forty years, the earnings of top 
lawyers and law firms have generally outpaced the rate of inflation, 
 
8 Thankfully, Income Based Repayment (IBR) and, more recently, Pay As You Earn pro-
grams help mitigate this issue to some degree.  See If Your Student Loan Debt Is High Rela-
tive to Your Income, You May Qualify for the Pay as You Earn Repayment Plan, FED. 
STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/pay-as-you-earn (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2013) (describing the programs available).  However, these programs do not 
represent anything close to a viable “solution” to the problem.  Students are left with educa-
tional debt for at least 20 years, not all loans qualify, and a huge “tax bomb” will expose the 
student to significant and immediate liability for any amount ultimately written off.  Moreo-
ver, these programs reflect our all too familiar approach to financing programs we don’t 
know how to (or don’t want to) pay for—we simply push the expense “down the road.”  In a 
country in which we shall, at some point, have to deal with the cost of promised future enti-
tlements (loan forgiveness is, essentially, an “entitlement”), there is no guarantee that pro-
grams like this will continue, as structured.  And, in the interim, the student’s debt just keeps 
continuing to grow. 
9 See Paul Caron, The Law School Crisis, PEPP. L. MAG., 
http://lawmagazine.pepperdine.edu/index.php/2012/09/the-law-school-crisis/ (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2013) (analogizing the problem of tuition pricing to that addressed by 2010 New 
York mayoral candidate Jimmy McMillan, who campaigned on a slogan that “[t]he rent is 
too damn high” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
10 See Critchlow, supra note 3. 
11 I am giving the legal academy the benefit of the doubt on this moral issue, rather than 
assuming we knew exactly what was happening, and only our graduates were fooled. 
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thereby providing ever improving financial opportunities for law 
school graduates.12  Not surprisingly, for the better part of the past 
thirty years, law school tuition prices chased those opportunities, also 
rising far beyond the rate of inflation.13  For some time, the growing 
prosperity of law practice was enjoyed by most lawyers—not just 
those at the top.  However, around 1990, an odd thing happened on 
the road to general prosperity when the fates of smaller firms and so-
los started heading in the opposite direction.  By the turn of the mil-
lennium, we had the beginning of the full bimodal salary curve we 
see today.14  However, law school tuition kept chasing those big-firm 
salaries ever upward, and the “reasoned investment” of days-gone-by 
quickly turned into something more akin to a “lottery” for the majori-
ty of law students.  In short, we have a legal education system priced 
based on the right hand side of the bimodal split (around $160,000), 
while most of the graduates of most of the law schools find employ-
ment—if at all—on the left side (around $40,000 to $60,000). 
 
Today, outside of the top few law schools, about half of all law grad-
uates promptly find full-time employment using their newly minted 
 
12 Barton, supra note 5. 
13 Deborah J. Merritt, Average Law School Tuition (Constant 2010 Dollars), available at 
http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-
akjGbowQM9o/UQ8S3nELCKI/AAAAAAAAAHs/HG3RdOKFOxs/s1600/Tuition.jpg. 
14 Barton, supra note 12. 
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JDs.15  For those who do, the median starting salaries likely amount 
to somewhere between one-third and one-half of their law school 
debt (and this is likely a generous characterization, except for those 
fortunate few who had no need to take out loans to finance their edu-
cation).  Under any reasonable financial analysis, this is a very poor 
investment.16  However, the story for today’s “median” law school 
graduate is only a small part of the problem.  The story for those be-
low the “median” is much worse.17 
The aspiring law student confidently sets out on the law 
school journey secure in the knowledge that he or she will certainly 
do better than most and perhaps even excel at the highest levels.  Few 
likely aspire to the “median,” and even fewer, if any, enter law school 
expecting just to survive and graduate in the bottom half.  Yet half of 
our students will, in fact, be in the bottom half of their class.18  Like 
our students, we in the academy face a similar “ranking” of the insti-
tutions with which we are associated.  Despite our persistent—and 
often very expensive—folly in seeking to “move up” by jumping 
 
15 Lincoln Caplan, An Existential Crisis for Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/an-existential-crisis-for-law-
schools.html?_r=0. 
16 See generally Jim Chen, A Degree of Practical Wisdom: The Ratio of Educational Debt 
to Income as a Basic Measurement of 
Law School Graduates’ Economic Viability, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1185, 1203 (2012) 
(explaining that “adequate” financial viability with respect to a law degree requires a salary 
equal to a graduate’s total law school tuition paid, while even “marginal” or “minimally ac-
ceptable” financial viability requires a salary equal to two-thirds of that total law school tui-
tion amount). 
17 See Jim Chen, Measuring the Downside Risk of Law School Attendance, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214337 (presenting a set of “hypothetical,” but very realistic data 
showing, for a total tuition of $60,000, a “median” salary of $45,000, a minimally viable sal-
ary of $40,000, and almost 40% of the graduates below that minimally viable salary); see 
also Jerome M. Organ, Hearing Comments (ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Educa-
tion, Feb., 2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/task
forcecomments/febhearing2013_jerome_organ_comment.authcheckdam.pdf (pointing out 
that those with the poorest admissions credentials are not only paying the most for law 
school, but also having the greatest difficulty in landing good paying jobs upon graduation). 
18 See David Segal, Law Students Lose the Grant Game as Law Schools Win, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/business/law-school-
grants.html?pagewanted=all (detailing the challenges for a “scholarship” student who ex-
pected to excel, but failed to understand the harsh dynamics of the law school curve); Debo-
rah J. Merritt & Daniel C. Merritt, Unleashing Market Forces in Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession (Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 180, 2012) [hereinafter 
Merritt & Merritt, Unleashing Market Forces], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2190398 (explaining the nature of com-
petition between students in law school as a “guild tournament[]”). 
380 AN ESSAY ON REBUILDING AND RENEWAL [Vol. 29 
through imaginary ranking hoops,19 half of us will always be in the 
“bottom half.” 
This essay will focus, to some degree, on how to reduce risks 
and improve legal education outcomes for the bottom half of students 
in the bottom half of all law schools.  This group represents 25% of 
current law graduates, and, as a group, they almost certainly bear a 
disproportionate share of the burden created by our broken educa-
tional model.20  While the suggestions that follow will in some ways 
specifically target this “bottom quartile,” I believe they would mate-
rially improve legal education for a substantial majority of all pro-
spective students. 
The most obvious disadvantage for the bottom quartile is that, 
in our hierarchical system of law school admissions and student rank-
ing within law schools, the lowest ranked students from the lowest 
ranked schools will, on average, have much more difficulty in secur-
ing reasonable opportunities to practice law.  Yes, we can all come up 
with anecdotal exceptions, but this group, as a whole, has a much 
tougher time in the legal employment market.  However, there are at 
least two additional disadvantages that make the plight of the bottom 
quartile law graduate even worse. 
First, statistical evidence (consistent with common sense) 
strongly suggests that lower ranked students are much more likely to 
fail the bar exam.21  Inasmuch as bar passage is an absolute prerequi-
site to law practice, we can safely assume that 0% of those who can-
not pass the bar exam will ultimately use their JD to practice law (at 
least not without violating the unauthorized practice of law rules).  
Admittedly, some will eventually pass after multiple attempts.  How-
ever, such extended time spent on bar passage will necessarily delay 
employment and may also reduce its ultimate likelihood or financial 
value. 
Second, the vast majority of “bottom half” law schools are 
almost entirely tuition driven.  These schools have little, if any, en-
 
19 See Critchlow, supra note 3. 
20 See Merritt & Merritt, Unleashing Market Forces, supra note 18; see also Organ, supra 
note 17 (pointing out that those with the poorest admissions credentials are paying the most 
for law school). 
21 See Douglas K. Rush and Hisako Matsuo, Does Law School Curriculum Affect Bar Ex-
amination Passage? An Empirical Analysis of Factors Related to Bar Examination Passage 
During the Years 2001 through 2006 at a Midwestern Law School, 57 J. LEG. ED. 224, 232 
(“Result 2: There was a strong association between law school class rank and passage of the 
bar examination on the first attempt.”). 
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dowments to support scholarships.  However, these same schools feel 
compelled to create scholarships out of tuition subsidies in hopes of 
recruiting better students (and, among other things, improving or 
maintaining the school’s institutional “ranking”22).  The applicants 
with the strongest credentials and the students with the best grades 
get “scholarships” in the form of tuition discounts, while the rest pay 
full price (which is of course inflated in order to cover the “scholar-
ship” subsidies).  You don’t have to be a math genius to figure out 
that these tuition subsidies result in the weaker students subsidizing 
the stronger students.  Thus, the bottom quartile generally ends up 
with the greatest debt upon graduation.23 
The above-described effects are particularly pernicious when 
one considers the purported existential rationale for many of these 
“bottom half” schools.  Many of the lowest ranked schools were 
opened in pursuit of providing greater “access” to legal education and 
law practice for historically excluded populations.24  One of the rea-
sons these groups had formerly been excluded was that they tended to 
have lesser “credentials” based on traditional law school admission 
criteria.25  Because these traditional admission criteria continue—
both directly and indirectly—to drive law school rankings, these “ac-
cess” schools generally tend to find themselves in the bottom half 
(and, more often than not, in the bottom quartile).  Thus, graduates 
from these traditionally excluded groups are even more likely than 
most to find themselves severely disadvantaged, and perhaps even fi-
nancially devastated, by the current law school financial model.26 
 
22 See Critchlow, supra note 3. 
23 This debt may also be heightened by the greater difficulty the lower ranked student will 
typically have in finding good paying employment while in law school. 
24 The cynic might suggest that many other law schools were simply created because legal 
education seemed to provide for an easily replicable “cash cow.”  While there may be some 
truth to this assertion, in some cases, I will leave that for others to debate.  For purposes of 
this essay, I am happy to attribute honorable “initial” motives to the legal academy.  The 
problem addressed herein is not the original motive, but the ultimate evolution of our cur-
rently high-priced model and, especially, the incredibly “tone deaf” refusal of the majority of 
the legal academy to acknowledge the current problem. 
25 While this group might, for example, include racial, ethnic, or economic groups that 
had been previously disadvantaged, my own categorization is not so limited.  My focus here 
is on anyone attending an “access” school by virtue of having applied to law school based on 
lower than typical traditional “predictors” of law school performance. 
26 See Gene R. Nichol, Rankings, Economic Challenge, and the Future of Legal Educa-
tion, 61 J. LEGAL ED. 345, 351 (2012) (discussing the exclusive effect high tuition costs may 
have on admission of “low and middle income students,” along with the “soaring debt lev-
els” carried by those who do attend, and the ultimate effect on the “cost of the delivery of 
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Many have argued that, first and foremost, we need to reduce the 
number of students we admit to law school each year.27  Predictably, 
others have protested that such reductions will have the effect of lim-
iting the sort of broad access that we have worked so hard to estab-
lish.28  In fact, reducing law school seats is not the issue we should be 
focusing on—our laser vision focus must be on reducing the cost of 
tuition (even if it increases the number of prospective applicants, 
which it should, based on a normal demand curve).  As many have 
accurately pointed out, our problem is not too many law graduates—
in fact, we still have many underserved markets for legal services.29  
Our problem is that the price of tuition is far too high, and graduates 
with enormous debt loads cannot afford to service those underserved 
markets.  Maintaining—and even improving—access to legal educa-
tion is an admirable and achievable goal.  However, doing so without 
impoverishing a generation of collateral casualties requires us to 
build a new model for legal education at a much lower cost of tui-
tion—one in which everyone at a given institution pays the same 
price, except in the case of true, externally funded, scholarships. 
II. REBUILDING BASED ON A NEW MODEL 
The rough contours of this model were first described in a 
Comment that my colleague, Meredith Miller, and I submitted in De-
cember to the ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education.30  
The current essay adds detail to that earlier description—particularly 
as it relates to the unique issues raised above with respect to students 
who find themselves below the class “median” at institutions below 
the national “median” rankings for law schools. 
The proposed model would deliver the first half of the JD cur-
riculum at a dramatically reduced price and would do so over twelve 
 
legal services”). 
27 Joe Palazzolo & Chelsea Phipps, With Profession Under Stress, Law Schools Cut Ad-
missions, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303444204577458411514818378.html. 
28 See id. (noting a concern for the effect reducing admissions would have on access to 
higher education). 
29 John J. Farmer, Jr., To Practice Law, Apprentice First, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/opinion/to-practice-law-apprentice-first.html?_r=0. 
30 Jack Graves and Meredith Miller, Comments on the Future of Legal Education (ABA 
Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, Dec. 2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/task
forcecomments/201212_graves_and_miller_correctcomments.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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calendar months—not by reducing curricular content, but simply by 
using a full twelve-month school calendar.31  Cost reductions would 
be achieved by moving to very large doctrinal classes (significantly 
larger than current “large” classes),32 likely including significant 
online components.33  While research, analysis, and writing instruc-
tion would continue to be delivered in relatively smaller classes, this 
too would likely benefit from greater efficiencies through the use of 
online components.  All of the doctrinal content necessary to prepare 
for the bar exam, as well as the necessary analytical and writing 
skills, would be delivered in 3 successive trimesters (or four succes-
sive quarters) within these first twelve months. 
This initial twelve-month program—Professor Miller and I 
call it Stage 1—could serve a number of different objectives, all of 
which would potentially generate law school revenue, thereby reduc-
ing the required tuition price per student.  First and foremost, Stage 1 
would lay the basic doctrinal and analytical foundation for a JD.  Se-
cond, it would prepare a JD student to take the bar exam upon com-
pletion.  Third, the completion of Stage 1, by itself, could be recog-
nized in a “Certificate” or “Master of Legal Studies” program 
intended for those interested in a basic legal education without the ac-
tual practice component or the predicate to licensure.34  Finally, Stage 
 
31 For the sake of clarity and simplicity, this essay solely focuses on a full-time program 
model.  While the application of the basic concepts to a part-time program would undoubted-
ly present additional logistical challenges, there is no fundamental reason they could not be 
so applied. 
32 New ideas often come from recycling old ones in a new context.  In this case, very large 
doctrinal classes could be supplemented by much smaller “recitation” sessions conducted by 
teaching assistants as part of their later “Stage 2” education.  These teaching assistants would 
operate entirely under the supervision and direction of the primary faculty member, thereby 
providing a more efficient delivery system, as well as an opportunity for more senior stu-
dents to complete the learning cycle through teaching.  See generally Christine N. Coughlin, 
See One, Do One, Teach One: Dissecting the Use of Medical Education’s Signature Peda-
gogy in the Law School Curriculum, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361 (2009). 
33  See Thies, supra note 7 (suggesting expansion of allowable credits earned through dis-
tance education).  By “online” education, I mean “synchronous” delivery using sophisticated 
state-of-the art educational software, allowing for significant interaction between faculty and 
individual students, observed by all and in which any can participate.  I am not referring to 
either pre-recorded webcasts or live broadcasts that do not allow for live interaction.  While 
any given course might include components (e.g., quizzes) that might be accessed in indi-
vidualized time frames, the primary instructional delivery method would be “synchronous,” 
just like it is today. 
34 Such a degree might be particularly useful individuals seeking a general introduction to 
law, such those intending careers in business management, other professional services, pub-
lic service, or legal process outsourcing.  The degree might also include a level of licensure 
short of a full license to practice law.  See Limited License Legal Technicians, WSBA, 
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1 would serve as an ideal introduction to U.S. law and legal methods 
for a foreign trained lawyer (i.e., as the primary basis for an LLM 
program in U.S. law for foreign trained lawyers). 
In addition to generating additional revenues, Stage 1 would 
involve a significantly lower faculty cost per student.  This cost 
would naturally be lowered by the increase in class sizes, and it could 
be lowered even further by increasing individual teaching loads.35  
The tuition for Stage 1 should be no more than $15,000, maximum.36 
Having successfully completed Stage 1, a student would then, 
ideally, be allowed to sit for the bar exam—not as a final step to li-
censure,37 but as an intermediate gateway to Stage 2 of the JD pro-
gram.  After the successful completion of Stage 2, the graduate would 
then (and only then) be eligible for licensure, without further exami-
 
http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-Lawyer-Conduct/Admissions/Limited-Licenses-and-
Special-Programs/Non-Lawyers-and-Students/Legal-Technicians (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) 
(describing Washington’s LLLT Rule). 
35 This of course raises at least two distinct, but related, issues—faculty scholarship and 
faculty head count, each of which would almost certainly be affected negatively in terms of 
quantity (whether this would negatively affect the quality of faculty scholarship is an entirely 
separate question, which I will leave for another day or another author).  During the last thir-
ty years of rising tuition cost, law school faculties have more than doubled in size, while 
teaching loads have at the same time fallen.  Barton, supra note 5.  Reversing this trend will 
of course be far more painful, but is at least as necessary as the original trend itself.  The 
eventual result will very likely improve legal education, overall.  See id. 
36 As Professor Miller and I originally explained in our earlier “Comment,” achieving the-
se sorts of cost reductions will necessarily involve reductions in current law school faculty.  
However, any given law school could, at least in theory, avoid some of all of this effect to 
the extent it was able to gain market share from other schools through early innovation.  Jim 
Chen has suggested the need to cut current faculty costs by one-third.  See Ethan Bronner, A 
Call for Drastic Changes in Educating New Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/us/lawyers-call-for-drastic-change-in-educating-new-
lawyers.html.  However, it is important to place this comment in the context of tuition at the 
University of Louisville, where Jim Chen is a faculty member.  He appears to use a blended 
rate (taking into account both in and out of state tuition), which results in about $60,000 total 
tuition for a JD.  See Chen, Measuring the Downside Risk, supra note 17.  Thus, his same 
analysis would suggest a two-thirds reduction for a school currently charging $40,000 per 
year, or $120,000 total for a JD (assuming of course a comparable median starting salary for 
graduates).  Admittedly, this would seem to place private schools at a potential disadvantage 
vis-à-vis public schools with taxpayer support.  However, this differential in public funding 
matters little to an informed student seeking a legal education at a reasonable price.  A pri-
vate school must simply do an even better job in efficiently employing limited resources to 
deliver a superior legal education. 
37 Compare Samuel Estreicher, The Roosevelt-Cardozo Way: The Case for Bar Eligibility 
After Two Years of Law School, 15 N.Y.U. J. OF LEGIS.& PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2012) 
(proposing to allow students to sit for the bar exam after completing two-thirds of the current 
JD program requirements and then immediately seek licensure upon passage, without ever 
completing the JD requirements), with Thies, supra note 7 (suggesting early bar 
administration, but still requiring graduation for licensure). 
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nation.  Everything a student needs to pass the bar exam can reasona-
bly be delivered in Stage 1 of the standard JD curriculum, and this 
approach would eliminate the current plague of third-year bar review 
courses thinly disguised as JD curricular content.  Once a student had 
successfully passed the bar exam, he or she could focus more fully on 
learning how to practice law during the final 12 months of the JD 
program delivered in Stage 2.38 
The typical student would likely spend three to six months 
outside of the JD program between Stages 1 and 2, depending on how 
quickly a state could provide bar exam results.39  Students might 
spend the time between the administration of the exam and the an-
nouncement of the results in a variety of ways, including positions as 
interns or law clerks.  However, a student would not be eligible to 
begin Stage 2 until he or she had successfully passed the bar exam. 
For those students who were not successful in their first at-
tempt at bar passage, the school could offer the opportunity to repeat 
doctrinal courses at little or no additional charge (there being little in-
cremental costs to the school), so that the student would incur little or 
no additional tuition costs without bar passage.40  For students that 
ultimately failed to pass the bar exam, the cost of the experience 
would be far lower than under the current model.  Thus, the financial 
cost of failure would be significantly reduced.  This approach could 
more fully realize the goals of increased “access” to a legal education 
(perhaps even taking a more flexible approach to admissions, having 
reduced the potential financial risks), while minimizing the risks as-
sociated with such increased access and significantly reducing the 
collateral financial casualties associated with the current model. 
 
38 This approach would allow an experience similar in many ways to that provided by the 
highly acclaimed Daniel Webster Scholar Honors Program at the University of New Hamp-
shire school of Law.  See Daniel Webster Scholar Honors Program, UNIV. OF NEW 
HAMPSHIRE: SCH. OF L., http://law.unh.edu/academics/jd-degree/daniel-webster-scholars/ 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (describing the two-year program available).  While not avoiding 
the bar exam, as in the case of the UNH program, the experience could be quite similar with 
the bar exam behind the student, except of course that the experience would be available to 
all students entering Stage 2 of the program. 
39 Ideally, a state administering the bar exam in July would complete the grading by the 
end of August, and the student would be able to complete this whole process in 3 months, 
assuming the school was on a quarter system.  Alternatively, the student could begin Stage 2 
after only a 4 month break for the bar exam if results were available in September, and the 
school was on a trimester system.  6 months is intended only as a worst-case example. 
40 A school might, however, provide optional tutoring for such students at a reasonable 
additional charge. 
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This “staged” approach to law school would not just reduce 
the risk of “failure,” but would also reduce the risk of simply chang-
ing one’s mind.  Many potential law students are uncertain as to 
whether a legal career is “right” for them.  Unfortunately, the cost of 
learning more, in the form of first-year tuition, is sufficiently high to 
scare off many prospects that might have actually enjoyed a legal ed-
ucation.  Too many others invest in that first year, despite their uncer-
tainty, and then feel compelled to throw more “good money after 
bad,” eventually becoming unhappy graduates and, in many cases, 
unhappy lawyers.  Under the proposed model, a student interested in 
studying law, but uncertain about his or her interest in practicing law, 
could invest in Stage 1 at a relatively modest tuition price, and then 
make objective and better informed later decisions with respect to the 
bar exam and Stage 2. 
The cost of delivering Stage 2 would be significantly greater 
than Stage 1.  The second stage would focus on practical skills, em-
ploying simulations, clinics, externships, and other practical experi-
ences, all in combination with additional doctrinal development (in-
cluding seminars) in a student’s chosen area or areas of focus.41  The 
cost of Stage 2 could be subsidized by revenue generating clinics, as 
part of a law school, as law firm42 (similar to the medical or dental 
school model), and it would, to a large degree, be delivered by facul-
ty who were simultaneously engaged in the practice of law.  Even so, 
it would necessarily be much more expensive than Stage 1.  The tui-
tion for Stage 2 might be in the range of $25,000 to $30,000.  How-
ever, no student would incur this amount without having first passed 
the bar exam.  Moreover, the total JD tuition would likely be under 
$45,000, and the student would be eligible for licensure a full year 
 
41 This “experiential” approach to the latter stage of a JD program is not particularly new, 
and many law schools have developed and are developing outstanding experiential learning 
programs.  However, this proposal for delivery the experiential segment after completion of 
the bar exam is new, and it provides significant opportunities for enhancement of such pro-
grams. 
42 See, e.g., Seeking Legal Help: The Law Offices of Chicago-Kent, IIT CHIC.-KENT C. OF 
L., http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/seeking-legal-help (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (a “teaching 
law firm with a dual mission—to provide high quality clinical education . . . and to deliver 
outstanding and competitively priced legal services to our clients”).  While the discussions of 
law schools, as law firms, have becoming increasingly commonplace with respect to “incu-
bators” for graduates, the idea admittedly remains quite controversial with respect to revenue 
generating “clinics” and the anticipated reaction of the practicing bar.  However, a well-
crafted program could target existing underserved legal markets and do so in collaboration 
with the practicing bar in a manner that could go a long way towards minimizing reasonable 
resistance. 
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earlier than under the current model (immediately upon completion 
of Stage 2), thus saving the student a full year of lost income oppor-
tunity costs.  And the same tuition “sticker” prices would be charged 
to all students—without regard to credentials—thus ending the cur-
rent “reverse Robin Hood” subsidies.43 
A law school’s educational efforts on behalf of its students 
should not, however, necessarily end at Stage 2.  A school should al-
so facilitate a third educational stage—the solo/small practice incuba-
tor.  An increasing number of graduates today are finding themselves 
on their own in establishing a law practice.  This may actually be a 
good thing if we have properly trained them to be entrepreneurs and 
innovators44 in providing cost effective legal services, including ser-
vices to traditionally underserved communities.  However, the skill 
set necessary to run a law firm typically goes well beyond that which 
even a practice-focused JD program can realistically provide.  The 
Stage 3 incubator bridges this gap, providing a safe, collaborative, 
mentored, and perhaps marginally subsidized environment in which 
to develop the skills and experience needed to operate a successful 
solo or small firm practice.45 
For the most part, this entire model can be realized under current 
ABA and state licensure rules.  However, two crucial changes are 
needed in order to maximize its potential: 
(1)  The state bar examiners would need to allow early administra-
tion of the bar exam.  Again, this would not eliminate the re-
quirement of a JD, but would simply move the bar exam, as 
an essential element for licensure, to an earlier point in time.  
States would incur no additional costs, the gatekeeping func-
tion of the bar exam would in no way be diminished, and the 
risk of failure would be dramatically reduced.  Moreover, 
those who successfully pass the bar exam could be afforded 
far greater opportunities afterwards to focus on practice skills 
 
43  See Organ, supra note 17 (citing Tamanaha, supra note 2) (describing this “ ‘reverse 
Robin Hood’ scenario”).  “Real” externally endowed scholarships would, of course, be unaf-
fected. 
44 See generally Renee N. Knake, Cultivating Learners Who Will Invent the Future of Law 
Practice: Some Thoughts on Educating Entrepreneurial and Innovative Lawyers, 38 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 847 (2012). 
45 This Stage 3 incubator might be operated as a part of the same “law school, as law 
firm” referenced in Stage 2, or it might be fully independent.  In either event, however, there 
are significant opportunities for collaboration between the incubator and clinical function. 
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and subject matter specialization—each of which would likely 
benefit the student, as well as his or her eventual clients. 
(2)  The ABA would need to allow greater use of online instruc-
tion throughout the JD program (or at least during the first 
half).  Under Standard 306, the use of online instruction is 
currently precluded during the first twenty-eight credit hours 
of a JD program, and the total use is limited to twelve credit 
hours within a JD program.  In fact, the technology available 
today allows for online instruction sufficiently comparable to 
“in-person” instruction, such that, in many instances, the sig-
nificant additional cost of “in-person” instruction does not 
justify the minimal incremental benefit.  This decision should 
be left to individual law schools in the same manner that other 
equally important pedagogical decisions are left to those 
schools and to individual faculty. 
At bottom, this essay is a plea to three crucial constituencies—the le-
gal academy,46 the state bar regulators, and the ABA.  With a con-
certed effort, we can all do much to make legal education affordable 
again, and, in the process, we can also make it a good deal better. 
 
 
46 To date, a great deal of skepticism has been expressed as to whether law school faculty 
are, themselves, ready, willing, or able to bring about the necessary reform in legal educa-
tion—especially that involving tuition reduction.  See, e.g., Bronner, supra note 36.  Howev-
er, the author remains hopeful that some will prove the skeptics wrong. 
